Ledger Chief Technology Officer Charles Guillemet will leave the hardware wallet manufacturer at the end of 2026, concluding a nine-year tenure overseeing the company’s technical architecture and security operations.
Guillemet announced his departure timeline on Thursday in a LinkedIn post, indicating that management had spent several months arranging the handover. He joined Ledger in December 2017 as chief security officer, roughly three years after the company was founded, before later stepping into the CTO role.
“We’ve been preparing this transition for many months, so Ledger’s teams, partners and roadmaps are ready. I’m bullish on Ledger’s future,” said Guillemet.
Building the Donjon Lab and Broadening Threat Models
A year after arriving at Ledger, Guillemet established Ledger Donjon, the firm’s dedicated attack and vulnerability research lab tasked with probing both firmware and physical chip hardware for exploits. Today, Guillemet estimates that Ledger hardware devices secure approximately 20% of circulating cryptocurrency assets.
Guillemet did not share full specifications for his next project, though he indicated he is “building something new” and plans to “dedicate my time to solving this security mess.” He linked that decision to the rapid evolution of digital attack vectors outside crypto native infrastructure.
“The threat landscape changed too. AI is making attacks cheaper, faster and easier to scale,” he added. “The question we spent a decade answering for crypto (how do you protect what matters when any device can be compromised?) is now a question for every company, every AI agent and every government.”
Supply Chain Infiltrations
The executive transition follows a difficult operational episode for the hardware manufacturer. Just weeks before Guillemet’s announcement, Ledger disclosed that threat actors had managed to physically alter authentic hardware wallets by soldering unauthorized components inside the chassis.
The rogue parts were engineered to intercept and exfiltrate private recovery phrases during initial setup. Those modified devices were then routed into legitimate distribution channels through authorized resellers, with compromised units initially uncovered in Asia before further tampered devices surfaced in Europe and the United Arab Emirates.




