A multi-billion-dollar exploit that siphoned more than $2.5 billion from Binance appears to have stemmed from an attack on transaction-signing architecture rather than the direct exfiltration of private keys, according to an assessment by blockchain security firm Blockaid.
The incident, which stands as the largest crypto theft on record, saw an attacker manipulate the exchange’s signing authorization workflows. Rather than securing physical control of the underlying seed phrase or private keys, the perpetrator bypassed internal safeguards to generate valid approvals for fraudulent transfers. Binance has not yet verified the specific technical vulnerability responsible for the losses.
Exploiting EIP-7702 Authorizations
Technical scrutiny of the initial transactions points to an exploit pathway involving newly introduced Ethereum standards. In an on-chain breakdown published on X, Blockaid tracked how the attacker bundled 50 distinct EIP-7702 authorizations into a single transaction directed at an account labeled Binance 14.
EIP-7702 introduces temporary smart contract capabilities to standard externally owned accounts, allowing them to delegate execution authority. Because one of the bundled authorizations aligned with the exchange account’s sequence nonce, the network accepted the batch. Blockaid said the affected account was subsequently assigned to an unverified sweeper contract, granting an external operator permissions to drain both Ether and token balances.
Carrying out an operation of this scale without triggering internal halts suggests the attacker navigated deep into the signing workflow, potentially accessing multiple endpoints across the exchange’s administrative network to coordinate the authorization payload.
Echoes of the Bybit Infrastructure Attack
The mechanics observed in the Binance drain bear strong similarities to the February 2025 breach suffered by Bybit. In that incident, Bybit’s published forensic update detailed how adversaries acquired developer credentials at Safe, injected malicious code into the wallet provider’s environment, and fed altered transaction requests to legitimate signers.
In both instances, the underlying cryptographic keys remained intact within their hardware or custodial modules. The vulnerability lay instead in the verification boundary: signers or automated approval daemons confirmed requests whose actual execution logic had been tampered with upstream.
Blockaid noted that the meticulous on-chain setup and contract deployment patterns resemble tactics frequently deployed by North Korean cyber operators, who have consistently prioritized signing infrastructure compromises over brute-force key theft when targeting centralized venues. Binance has yet to publish a full post-mortem detailing how the unauthorized EIP-7702 batch cleared its internal signing policies.




